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states on the basis of populafion,5 were botched provi-
sions. They were either intended to have no sig-
nificance, apart from compromising with slavery, or, in 
the alternative, were so defective that they had to be 
discarded as unworkable. The Supreme Court's 1796 
decision in Hylton v. United States6 effectively gutted 
the clauses, and, for Johnson, that was a good thing. 
When the Court in 1895 reinvigorated the clauses in 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 7 by striking down 
an unapportioned income tax, it made a horrible mis-
take, says Johnson. The 1913 ratification of the 16th 
Amendment, which exempted "taxes on incomes" from 
apportionment, put the tax world back where it had 
been before the Supreme Court screwed things up in 
Pollock - with the Direct-Tax Clauses playing no sig-
nificant role - or so the argument goes. 
I appreciate Professor Johnson's 
candor about the nature of his project, 
but 'manipulative expansion' isn't an 
acceptable method of constitutional 
interpretation. 
At bottom, what all of this means to Professor 
Johnson is that, in evaluating the legitimacy of an un-
apportioned tax today, we should go back to the under-
standing of the Hylton justices, under which nothing 
but a capitation tax or a tax on real estate should be 
subject to apportionment.8 And, if there's any doubt 
about the appropriate result in a particular case, 
Johnson urges us to use "manipulative expansion" of 
5See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included 
within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Ser-
vice for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. 
See also U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other 
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census 
or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."). Appor-
tionment therefore means that a state with, say, one-twen-
tieth of the national population must bear one-twentieth of 
the aggregate liability associated with any direct tax, regard-
less of the state's percentage of the national tax base. 
63 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
7157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding unapportioned tax on income 
from real estate unconstitutional); 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (ex-
tending principle to income from personal property and 
rejecting entire 1894 tax). 
8Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.); id. at 183 (Iredell, 
J.); id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); see infra notes 75-77 and accom-
panying text. Given what Johnson says about wealth taxes, 
he must think that even a tax on real estate is no longer 
subject to apportionment. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728-
29 and 1733; infra Part III.B; see also Calvin H. Johnson, "Ap-
portionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the 
Constitution," 7 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 70 (1998) ("Even 
considering land tax a 'direct tax' makes the apportionment 
requirement contrary to the more general intent."). 
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constitutional terms to ensure that apportionment isn't 
required.9 
I appreciate Professor Johnson's candor about the 
nature of his project, but "manipulative expansion" 
isn't an acceptable method of constitutional interpreta-
tion. In rebutting Johnson, I'll rri.ake several points. 
First, I briefly explicate my own position, which 
Johnson niischaracterizes: He makes me appear even 
crazier than I really am by overstating the extent to 
which I believe the Constitution might preclude na-
tional taxes on consumption. Second, I argue that his 
version of the original understanding of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses gives those clauses way too little scope. Final-
ly, I challenge his characterization of what the 16th 
Amendment did to the Direct-Tax Clauses. Among 
other things, I conclude that a direct-consumption tax 
and a tax on wealth should both be subject to the ap-
portionment requirement today. 
I. Direct Taxation and the 16th Amendment 
According to Professor Johnson, I argue that "Con-
gress may not tax wealth and may not adopt a national 
sales or consumption tax," 10 at least not unless Con-
gress apportions the tax. Or, as the synopsis of 
Johnson's article puts it, my position is supposedly that 
a "federal tax on consumption, sales or wealth would 
not be constitutional because the 16th Amendment al-
lows only a tax on 'income/ without apportionment of 
the tax among the states."11 
That's only partly right, and it's a quite misleading 
characterization of my views. Because everyone con-
cedes that the Direct-Tax Clauses were intended to 
apply to national taxes on real estate, I have little doubt 
that a wealth tax would be subject to the apportion-
ment rule, as originally understood/2 and it also 
wouldn't be a "tax on incomes" exempted by the 16th 
Amendment from apportionment. 13 But Johnson is 
wrong about the extent to which I think the Direct-Tax 
Clauses prohibit consumption taxes. 
Taxes on consumption are subject to apportionment 
only to the extent that they are direct taxes, and the 
classic consumption tax, one imposed on the transfer 
of articles of consumption- including what we would 
today call a sales tax - was precisely the sort of tax 
the Founders understood to be indirect.14 The Founders 
assumed that the burden of indirect taxes was shifted 
to the ultimate purchaser of the goods, and indirect 
9J ohnson, supra note 1, at 1734; see infra notes 89-90 and 
accompanying text. 
10Johnson, supra note 1, at 1723. 
llJd. 
12See infra Part III.B.l. 
13See infra Part III.B.2. 
14The indirect taxes are the "Duties, Imposts and Excises" 
subject to the uniformity rule. See supra note 3. I concluded 
that an unapportioned sales tax or VAT would be constitu-
tional in Erik M. Jensen, "The Apportionment of 'Direct 
Taxes': Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?" 97 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2334, 2405-07 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Apportion-
ment], excerpted in Tax Notes, Nov. 2, 1998, p. 611. 
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taxes could therefore be avoided: If you don't want to 
pay the tax, you can buy an untaxed good instead. With 
this built-in protection against governmental over-
:eaching, in~ire.ct taxes required no special limitations 
In the Conshtuhon.15 If a consumption tax isn't a direct 
tax to begin with, apportionment isn't required, and 
we needn't worry about whether the tax is covered by 
the 16th Amendment.16 
What I. have argued is that taxes on consumption 
that are dzrect taxes, but aren't taxes on incomes, con-
tinue to be subject to the apportionment requirement. 
As a resulti certain direct-consumption taxes (the flat 
tax and the USA tax proposed in the 1990s, for example) 
c~uld have constitutional problems. They would be 
duect taxes, as I understand the original meaning of 
the Direct-Tax Clauses;17 they couldn't be apportioned 
and do what they are intended to do;18 and, because 
the direct-consumption taxes would remove the 
sa_vings componen! from the income tax base, they 
might well not be taxes on incomes" as the drafters 
and ratifiers understood the 16th Amendment.19 At a 
minimum, it would be foolhardy for Congress to 
proceed on the assumption that an unapportioned 
direct-consumption tax is automatically constitutional. 
Professor Johnson is right that the importance of my 
argument about the meaning of the 16th Amendment 
- that consumption taxes and income taxes were 
un~erstood to be fundamentally different types of 
levies, and that a consumption tax is not a "tax on 
incomes"20 - is dependent on the proposition that Pol-
lock was rightly decided in 1895. If, instead, the cate-
gory of direct taxes includes nothing but capitation and 
real-estate taxes (as suggested by several justices in 
Hylton, decided in 179621 ), then Pollock was wrong; the 
15In generat if a government overdoes an indirect tax, reve-
nue actually drops because people stop buying the taxed 
goods, or otherwise take steps to avoid the tax. As a result, 
there's no incentive for the government to abuse its authority. 
16To be valid, such a levy need only be geographically 
uniform. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1; see supra note 3. 
I have had some second thoughts about my conclusion 
~ha~ a national sales tax or VAT would necessarily be an 
mdirect tax, see supra note 14, at least insofar as the tax might 
be broad-based. The Founders conceived of the relatively 
benign indirect taxes (excises, imposts, and duties), those 
that could be avoided, as being targeted at particular goods, 
where substitutes were available. If a sales or value-added 
tax were levied on most consumer goods, however, so that 
avoidance would be difficult, the tax wouldn't fit so well 
with the Founders' conception of an indirect tax. See Jensen, 
Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1085 n.131. I'm still inclined to 
vi~w a nati~nal sale~ tax or VAT as indirect, but my uncer-
tamty level IS now h1gh on this question. 
• 
17See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2407-08; 
mfra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
18See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2404. 
19See id. at 2408-14; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 
1129-46; infra Part liLA. 
20See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1091-1129; infra 
Part liLA. 
21 See infra note 76. 
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16th Amendment was unnecessary'tb permit .an unap-
portioned income tax; and the meaning of "taxes on 
incomes" in the Amendment doesn't matter.22 If an 
income tax··isn't. a direct tax, then the proposed direct-
consumption taxes also presumably wouldn't be direct 
taxes. End .of analysis. 
But that analysis is wrong atevery step. In the next 
part, I explain how Professor Johnson's conception of 
the original meaning of the Direct-Tax Clauses is much 
too narrow and why, therefore, the Pollock Court 
properly concluded that an income tax is a direct tax. 
II, The Direct-Tax Clauses 
Most Fom,1ders feared a national taxing power. They 
wanted to strengthen the minimal taxing power that 
had existed under the Articles of Confederation, to be 
sure, but they also wanted to keep that power under 
check. Limitations on the taxing power weren't after-
thoug~ts at the Philadelphia Convention, and one of 
those limitations was the apportionment rule for direct 
taxes. · 
First, let me torch a couple of Professor Johnson's 
straw men (or, as we now say in the academy, people 
of stra\-\r). By quoting a number of Founders about the 
importance of direct taxation, Johnson implies that I 
think direct taxation is forbidden by the Constitution. 
For example, he writes that "Washington's stubborn 
refusal to allow anything that goes to the prevention 
of direct taxati"on represents the Founders' intent."23 
Fine, but that's beside the point. I've never suggested 
that direct taxation isn't permissible; indeed, no one 
suggests that. 
It's one thing to conclude, as Professor Johnson 
properly does, that Congress can impose direct taxes. 
It's quite another to jump to the conclusion that the 
Founders constructed a system under which d1rect 
t~xation was to be unconstrained, and that~ the appor-
tiOnment rule -a part of the Constitution, after all - is, 
and always was, a nullity.24 
220r at least it doesn't matter much. If the term "taxes on 
incomes"includes a wealth tax, as Professor Johnson suggests 
that it does, see Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733, then an unap-
portioned national tax on real estate would presumably be 
constitutional, despite the original understanding that such a 
tax is a direct tax. See infra Part III.B.2. 
23Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728. 
24Professor Johnson devotes a fair amount of attention to 
the Direct-Tax Clauses' unfortunate connection with slavery. 
(Slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a person for 
purposes of apportioning direct-tax liability among the 
states, just as slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a 
person for representation in the House of Representatives. 
See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, quoted in supra note 5.) As 
does Bruce Ackerman, Johnson seems to suggest that the 
slavery taint is justification for ignoring the apportionment 
rule. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1724-25 and 1734; Bruce 
Ackerman, "Taxes imd the Constitution," 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
58 (1998). While it's obviously true that the limitation on 
direct taxation took the form it did because of slavery, there's 
no reason to think that the Constitution would have been 
(Footnote 24 continued on the next page.) 
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A second, related straw person of Professor 
Johnson's: I'm apparently supposed to concede that, 
because the Federalists "won" the battles on taxation 
in Philadelphia and the state ratifying conventions, the 
direct taxing power was. unlimited.25 Baseball and the 
Constitution are both fundamental to American 
society, but writing a Constitution isn't like a ball 
game, an ali-or-nothing contest- with one clear win-
ner and one clear loser. In Constitution writing, as in 
politics generally, "winners" seldom achieve all of their 
goals. 
Of course the Federalists were more successful than 
the Anti-Federalists - they were winners in that im-
portant respect - and direct taxation was unques-
tionably intended to be among the powers of Congress. 
(No one, I repeat, doubts that the Federalists prevailed 
on that point.) But, when it came to taxation, the 
Federalists didn't get what they wanted in an un-
diluted form. For one prominent example, the 
Federalists generally opposed the Export Clause, 
which prevents Congress from taxing "Articles ex-
ported,"26 but the Clause wound up in the Constitution 
anyway: there would have been no Constitution 
without it.27 And, for that matter, not all Federalists 
thought the taxing power should be unconstrained;28 
even the strongest proponents of a powerful national 
government didn't suggest in public that the govern-
ment could do anything to raise revenue. 29 To say that 
the Federalists "won" isn't to say that the taxing power 
is limitless. 
One of Johnson's primary points, which draws force 
from opinions in Hylton v. United States, 30 is that appor-
tionment fell by the wayside quickly because "[a]ppor-
tionment of direct tax turned out to be a rule too silly 
silent about direct taxation if slavery hadn't existed. See Jen-
sen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2385; Jensen, Taxing 
Power, supra note 1, at 1074. 
25See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1727. 
26 See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5; supra note 4. Among 
the opponents of a limitation on the national government's 
power to tax exports were Founders Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, Governeur Morris, George Washington, and 
James Wilson- a formidable group. See Erik M. Jensen, "The 
Export Clause," 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 7-16 (2003) [hereinafter 
Jensen, Export Clause]. 
27See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 26, at 6-16. 
28The views of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, 
for example, weren't even close to being identical. Madison 
thought the direct-tax apportionment rule was "one of the 
safeguards of the Constitution." 4 Annals of Cong. 730 (1794) 
(describing why he was voting against an unapportioned 
carriage tax, the constitutionality of which was later at issue 
in Hylton). 
29Whatever he thought in his heart of hearts, Alexander 
Hamilton didn't argtJ.e that the national taxing power was 
limitless when he was trying to get the Constitution ratified. 
See, e,g., The Federalist No. 36, at 220 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ("An actual census or enumeration of the people must 
furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the 
door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of 
[real-estate] taxation seems to have been provided against 
with guarded circumspection."). 
303 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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to enforce, in those cases in which the tax base is not 
equal per capita among the states."31 If t0e tax base , 
isn't distributed equally, rates will have to differ 
among the states, or some other compensating mecha-
nism will be required to satisfy the apportionment rule. 
And, just like the justices in Hylton, Professor Johnson 
can easily come up with examples to make apportioned 
taxes look ridiculous.32 
The problem with the Johnson formulation, even as 
buttressed by Hylton, however, should be apparent. 
Professor Johnson is saying nothing more than that 
apportionment should be required only when it makes 
no difference, when the tax at issue is already auto-
matically apportioned. You "enforce" the rule only 
when there's nothing to enforce. That's not the state-
ment of a rule; it's the obliteration of a rule. It's like 
saying that the rule prohibiting unreasonable searches 
and seizures should be invoked only to analyze 
reasonable searches and seizures.33 Even imperfect pro-
visions, if that's what the Direct-Tax Clauses are, 
should be interpreted in as robust a way as possible. 34 
And there is a reasonable way to interpret the Direct-
Tax Clauses so that they have effect. The clauses are 
written as if they are limitations on the taxing power, 
and that's how they should be understood. The clauses 
make it difficult (not impossible, but difficult) to im-
pose direct taxes. Professor Johnson correctly assumes 
that having different tax rates in different states -
31Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725; id. at 1734 ("Apportionment 
is a silly and hobbling requirement, as the Founders recog-
nized in Hylton, when the tax base is uneven."). In Hylton, 
Justice Chase had written that 
[t]he Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as 
direct taxes, but only such as Congress could lay in 
proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is 
only to be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonab-
ly apply; and the subject taxed, must ever determine 
the application of the rule. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 17 4. Justice Iredell agreed: "As all 
direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident, that the con-
stitution contemplated none as direct, but such as could be 
apportioned. If this [carriage tax] cannot be apportioned, it 
is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the constitution." 
Id. at 181. 
32See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725 (arguing, for example, 
that, if apportionment were required with a carriage tax like 
that in Hylton, "the poor fool to drive the first carriage into 
Kentucky would have to bear Kentucky's entire state quota"). 
33Professor Johnson somehow thinks that a 17th century 
English case, where a court refused to enforce a contractual 
i:erm because, as Johnson puts it, the term was "too silly to 
enforce," is relevant in constitutional interpretation. Id. at 
1725 (discussing James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (1658)). 
Constitutional terms do get in the way - that's the point, 
isn't it? - and it's a bit much to suggest they should be 
disregarded when they become inconvenient. 
. 
34Professor Johnson approvingly quotes Alexander 
Hamilton's argument in Hylton: "[N]o construction ought to 
prevail calculated to defeat the express and necessary author-
ity of the government." Id. at 1726. That's true in a way, I 
suppose, but you can'ttell what the Founders thought the 
necessary authority of the government was without con-
sidering the express limitations built into the Constitution. 
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something that might happen if the apportionment rule 
is applicable - is generally going to be seen as an 
absurdity, but he then concludes that the rule is there-
fore an absurdity. Quite the contrary. It's because the 
rule might lead to facially suspect results -
Mississippi's citizens, say, subjected to taxation at 
higher rates than Connecticut's - that the rule has 
effect. 
Professor Johnson's parade of 
horribles won't start its march down 
Broadway because the political 
process will generally ensure that his 
absurd apportionment scenarios won't 
occur. 
Professor Johnson's parade of horribles won't start 
its march down Broadway because the political 
process, operating in the shadow of the apportionment 
rule, will generally ensure that his absurd apportion-
ment scenarios won't occur. If Congress is inclined to 
use direct taxes in the first place (and the Founders 
didn't think the United States would have to rely on 
direct taxation in the ordinary course of its business35), 
the apportionment rule pushes Congress in the direc-
tion of implementing only those levies with uniformly 
distributed bases - "equal per capita among the 
states,"36 to use Professor Johnson's phrase. The fear 
that taxation might be used to cripple one section of 
the country was pervasive at the Constitutional Con-
vention, 37 and, in ordinary situations, the apportion-
ment rule makes enactment of a blatantly sectional tax 
unlikely. 
If the base of a proposed direct tax is "equal per 
capita among the states," the tax, by definition, will 
satisfy the apportionment rule, and it will be relatively 
easy to justify politically. There's no arguable element 
of sectional preference (that is, one set of states ganging 
up to disproportionately tax another set of states). Con-
gressmen from Mississippi and Connecticut can 
evaluate the proposed tax on the merits, without wor-
rying about sectional disparities. 
If the proposed tax base is not "equal per capita 
among the states," however - presumably the usual 
situation- selling the tax to Congress is going to be 
much more difficult, and rightly so. For example, im-
agine a proposed tax on dogsleds38 that would be 
nominally uniform~ the same rate would apply in all 
parts of the United States39 - but, without apportion-
ment, the negative effects of the tax would clearly be 
disproportionately felt in Alaska and other northern 
states. Mississippi congressmen who aren't otherwise 
35See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2382-83. 
36Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725. 
37That concern was behind the Export Clause, see Jensen, 
Export Clause, supra note 26, at 7-16, and it was also clearly 
one of the reasons justifying the uniformity rule. 
38Hey, I get to use my absurd examples, too. 
39That's all the uniformity rule requires. See supra note 3. 
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concerned about the fairness of the tax base might well 
be enthusiastic about a tax burden that would be borne 
entirely, or almost entirely, by someone else. If the 
dogsled tax is considered direct, however, the appor-
tionment rule would require that Mississippi citizens 
also bear a proportionate share of the total tax burden 
(measured by Mississippi's percentage of the national 
population) - that is, the tax could no longer be uni-
form40 - and the enthusiasm of Mississippi con-
gressmen (and others similarly situated) for the tax 
would be substantially lessened. 
Another example: Imagine for a moment that we 
have no 16th Amendment, and that there's still con-
troversy about whether an income tax must be appor-
tioned. (And remember that, in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, many viewed the personal income tax 
as sectional, just like my hypothetical dogsled tax. 41 ) 
Professor Johnson thinks it's horrible that, if an income 
tax would have to be apportioned~ the rates applicable 
to citizens of Mississippi would have to be much higher 
than those applicable to citizens of Connecticut.42 And 
I agree that the result would be grossly unfair to Mis-
sissippians, if such an apportioned tax were actually 
enacted.43 
But Johnson's argument again misses the point: The 
existence of the apportionment rule makes enactment 
of an apportioned income tax unlikely. Mississippi con-
40The uniformity rule and the apportionment rule are 
mutually exclusive: A levy is governed by one or the other, 
but not both. When a tax must be apportioned, it is generally 
going to be the case that it can't be uniform as well. See Jensen, 
Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2341-42. 
41As the 19th century waned, the appeal of the income tax 
to populists and other firebrands was that it would dis-
proportionately hit the industrial Northeast, where the 
greatest wealth and the highest incomes were concentrated. 
(A very high exemption amount made the tax applicable only 
to very-high-income persons.) See Jensen, Taxing Power, 
supra note 1, at 1102-06. Indeed, some opponents of the in-
come tax claimed that it violated the uniformity clause be-
cause it was so clearly sectionally based. That argument 
failed: The rates were uniform throughout the country, and 
that's all that the uniformity rule requires. See supra note 3; 
Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1065-66. BU:t the income 
tax was no less sectional just because it was "uniform." 
42See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725. 
430f course, not everything that is arguably unfair is un-
constitutional. Professor Johnson assumes that, if I think ap-
portionment should be taken seriously;. I must approve of 
absurdly different tax rates in different states. But just be-
cause I think a rule would operate in a particular way in a 
particular hypothetical situation- assuming that a bizarrely 
apportioned tax could be enacted in the first place - doesn't 
mean that I would approve of those hypothetical results. 
For what it's worth, I'd prefer that citizens of Mississippi 
and Connecticut pay federal taxes at the same rates. If I were 
a congressman, I'd generally· vote against taxes that would 
have to be apportioned, and, if a direct tax other than an 
income tax somehow became necessary - to raise funds in 
an emergency such as wartime - the apportionment rule 
might well lead to results that I'd prefer not to see. But what 
Professor Johnson or I think about the desirability of 
geographically variable rates doesn't define the boundaries 
of constitutional principles. 
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gressmen aren't going to support a tax that requires 
higher-than-average tax rates in their jurisdiction, nor 
will congressmen from the other poorer states. As a 
general matter, the apportionment rule removes the 
incentive for states with a disproportionately small 
percentage of a particular direct-tax base from pushing 
for a tax that, without apportionment, would dis-
proportionately burden other states. Furthermore, the 
need to apportion makes the sectional nature of the 
legislation transparent. If different rates will be ap-
plicable in different states, that will make it more dif-
ficult for anyone to support the tax. One hopes that 
congressmen generally- even those from Connecticut 
(and Texas?) ~ would balk at the imposition of an 
income tax with geographically variable rates. 44 
As a result, except in emergencies, when revenue-
raising needs may trump other concerns, political pres-
sures will keep Congress from enacting a tax with 
markedly sectional effects. 45 In the ordinary course, 
Congress will either not rely on direct taxes at all or 
will impose direct taxes only on tax bases that are 
"equal per capita among the states" - or close to it. 
One might disagree with the goal of limiting congres-
sional power,46 or be indifferent to the purported 
dangers of sectional taxation, or find fault with the way 
the apportionment rule implements its goals in a par-
ticular case. But the enterprise isn't "too silly to en-
force."47 
Despite the good sense at the core of the apportion-
ment rule, Professor Johnson would have us defer to 
the dicta of the Federalist justices in Hylton. If Justice 
44The Supreme Court recognized the practical political.dif-
ficulties of apportioning certain taxes in one of the cases Cited 
by Professor Johnson: "[N]o Congress would dare to appor-
tion, for instance, the income tax." Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 
Wall.) 331, 343 (1875), quoted in Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728. 
The corollary is that, if the income tax has to be apportioned, 
there is unlikely to be an income tax, except in times of na-
tional emergency. 
45 Assuming that the apportionment requirement is satis-
fied, a direct tax can be imposed at any time. But the 
Founders assumed that direct taxation would be used only 
in wartime and other emergency situations. See Jensen, Ap-
portionment, supra note 14, at 2382-83. 
46Professor Johnson's conception of the apportionment 
rule gets the constitutional scheme upside down. He wants 
the rule to apply only when the tax base is uniformly dis-
tributed, when, by definition, there's no danger of sectional 
taxation. And he wants the rule to have no application to 
cases in which nominally uniform taxes have sectionally dis-
proportionate effects. 
47Professor Johnson is right that apportionment, if actually 
applied to a particular tax, could hurt the poorer states -he 
uses an apportioned income tax as an example, see Johnson, 
supra note 1, at 1725 n,17- but it could help them as well. 
How it would work depends on what it is that would be 
taxed. If you're trying to imagine a worst-case scenario, you 
might imagine Congress, in a world without apportionment, 
targeting relatively poor southern states with a nominally 
uniform, but sectionally based, direct tax - maybe a tax on 
land used to grow cotton. Apportionment makes a sectionally 





Iredell said that, "[a]s all direct taxes must be appor-
tioned, it is evident, that the constitution contemplated 
none as direct, but such as could be apportioned,"48 his 
statement is supposed to be gospel. Iredell and friends 
were Founders - "giants [who] walked upon the 
Earth,"49 in Johnson's pnrase- and "[t]hey knew the 
Constitution far better than we do."50 
Well, maybe yes, maybe no. 51 Certainly all Founders 
didn't interpret constitutional provisions in the same 
way.s2 And the Hylton Court was a Federalist Court: It 
viewed its function as propping up, rather than check-
ing, the Federalist government.53 As time went on, and 
the Federalists were losing their grip on power, their 
positions were less and less constrained by. consti~­
tional dictates. It was early Congresses - filled with 
Johnson's "giants"- that gave us the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts and other constitutional outrages.54 
As Justice Souter explained in another context, in 
rejecting use of the founding generation's behavio~ as 
a necessarily determinative method of discerning 
original understanding, "[P]ublic officials, no matter 
when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional 
principle."55 It generally isn't a good idea to rely on 
those in power to define the limits of their power, and 
we ought to be particularly skeptical of Founders' 
statements that, if given controlling weight, would 
have the effect of gutting constitutional provisions. 56 
If we take off our 21st century hats, and try to put 
ourselves back into the 18th century, it should be ob-
vious how counterintuitive the Johnson position is.57 
Imagine Calvin Johnson, who had been prominent at 
48Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 181 (Iredell, J.). 
49Johnson, supra note 1, at 1726. 
SOJd. 
51 It's not at all clear that we're at a scholarly disadvantage 
today. We have available many primary sources that most 
members of the founding generation were unaware of. Be-
sides, they didn't have computers. 
52 See supra note 28. 
53 See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1079 n.115. 
54If I remember my fairy tales and operas correctly, giants 
often weren't the good guys. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 
1 Stat. 577 ("An Act respecting Alien Enemies"); Act of July 
14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 ("An Act in addition to the act, 
entitled 'An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against 
the United States"). Similarly, a 1797 tax statute blatantly 
ignored the Export Clause. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra 
note26, at 21-25 (discussing Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, sectwn 
1, 1 Stat. 527); U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5. 
55Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
56 I don't mean to suggest that the views of Federalist of-
ficials, including Hylton justices, are irrelevant in trying to 
discern original understanding. The views of the Hylton jus-
tices are relevant data, to be evaluated in context, but they 
shouldn't be taken as automatically controlling. 
57 I£ Professor Johnson wants to argue that original under-
standing is irrelevant, or impossible to discern, that's one 
thing. (I generally disagree with that proposition, but it's 
commonly advanced in constitutional analysis.) That doesn't 
seem to be Johnson's position, however. If it were, what 
(Footnote 57 continued on the next page.) 
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the Philadelphia convention in 1787, speaking on be-
half of the Constitution before the Texas ratifying con-
vention. 58 (Welt of course Texas should have been one 
of the 13 colonies.) When asked whether the Constitu-
tion imposes· any serious limitation on the national 
government's power to tax, delegate Johnson answers, 
"No, certainly not. This is a pro-tax document." When 
asked if the Constitution would permit the national 
government to impose an unapportioned tax on the 
personal incomes of American citizens and residents, 
delegate Johnson responds, "Absolutely! I've never 
heard of such a tax, but nothing in the Constitution 
would prevent it. Moreover, the Constitution also 
won't limit any other new methods of taxation that our 
descendants can think of." 
Say what? With those interpretations of the Direct-
Tax Clauses, the Texas convention wouldn't have voted 
to ratify the Constitution.59 If there had been such a 
general understanding of the national powers created 
in Philadelphia (whether or not an imaginary Texas 
colony was involved), we wouldn't have had a Con-
stitution (or this article). Peculiar though the direct-tax 
apportionment rule may have been in form, it was 
intended to be a hobble on the national taxing power. 
Which leads to the question of how we should 
evaluate forms of taxation that were unknown in 1787, 
like the income tax. In their discussions of direct taxa-
tion, the Founders generally expressed concern about 
capitation taxes and real estate taxes (the two catego-
ries specifically mentioned by Hylton justices as direct 
taxes), and (obviously) they couldn't have talked about 
forms of taxation that hadn't yet been devised. Profes-
sor Johnson suggests that, if the Founders weren't 
specific in limiting or prohibiting a particular form of 
taxation, that form can be imposed today without 
restriction (other than requiring that the levy be 
geographically uniform). 
How strange! It would be a peculiar Constitution 
indeed that governed only the specific sorts of behavior 
that could have been contemplated in 1787, but that's 
exactly the sort of position that Professor Johnson is 
promoting. It's like interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment as having no application to electronic surveil-
lance. 
The Constitution ought instead to be interpreted in 
a way that gives weight to its provisions. I've described 
what I see as the proper way to interpret the meaning 
of "direct taxes" in a couple of articles. 60 In summary 
form, it goes something like this: Taxes are either in-
direct or direct. The indirect taxes, generally those im-
J ohns~m has to say about original understanding also 
wouldn't matter- a good thing, perhaps, but obviously not 
what he has in mind. 
58I've used this thought experiment before, with another 
target. See Erik M. Jensen, "Taxation and the Constitution: 
How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses," 15 J. L. & Pol. 687, 687 
(1999) [hereinafter, Jensen, Taxation]. 
59Indeed, I doubt that today's Texas would vote to ratify 
such a document. 
60See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2393-97; 
Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1073-77. 
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posed on transfers of articles of consumption, were 
considered safe enough to leave in the hands of the 
national government, without constraints other than 
the uniformity rule.61 The taxes that aren't indirect-
those that don't have the built-in protections against 
governmental abuse that are characteristic of indirect 
· taxes - were intended to be difficult to impose. In 
short, if a tax isn't an indirect tax (or after the ratifica-
tion of the 16th Amendment, a "tax on incomes"), then 
it's subject to apportionment. 
The personal income tax doesn't have the charac-
teristics of the classic indirect taxes, and it therefore 
ought to have been treated as a direct tax. The Pollock 
Court thus got the result right: Until the 16th Amend-
ment came along, an income tax should have been 
subject to the apportionment rule. 62 And the Pollock 
Court was right that the conception of "direct taxes" 
reflected in the opinions in Hylton v. United States, in 
1796, was much too narrow; 
When the 16th Amendment did come along, it mere-
ly provided that "taxes on incomes" need not be ap-
portioned. I'll next consider what the Amendment did 
to the scope of the Direct-Tax Clauses more generally. 
III. The 16th Amendment 
With my understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses 
and the validity of Pollock, the 16th Amendment was 
essential if Congress was going to have the power to 
enact an unapportioned income tax. In this part of the 
article, I consider the scope of the Amendment and 
respond to Professor Johnson's arguments that the 
Amendment was unnecessary and that Congress has 
the power to enact an unapportioned tax on wealth. 
A. The Amendment and Pollock 
If the Direct-Tax Clauses mean little or nothing, as 
Professor Johnson argues, then the 16th Amendment 
was indeed superfluous. And Johnson characterizes 
the move to the Amendment as nothing but a tactical 
maneuver. Most Amendment supporters, Johnson ar-
gues, thought Pollock was so clearly wrong that the 
Amendment was, as a technical matter, surplusage. 
The problem was that the votes weren't there to go 
ahead with a new income tax unless the Constitution 
was amended first. 63 In Johnson's view, the Amend-
ment merely made it politically possible to get a new 
income tax on the books, and the Amendment 
shouldn't be interpreted as a validation of the result in 
Pollock. 
61 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
62I don't want to defend everything in the Pollock 
majority's opinions. When it comes to reactionary views, I'm 
hard to embarrass, but there's still a lot in Pollock that em-
barrasses me. Nevertheless, wretched excess doesn't mean 
that the Court got the result wrong. 
63See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1731-33. Some income-tax 
supporters were nervous about offending the Supreme 
Court, for example. And, even if the Court had been absolute-
ly wrong in Pollock, there was no guarantee that the Court 
would get it right the next time, unless the Constitution was 
changed. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1109-14. 
827 
A preliminary point: Why congressmen in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries should be treated as 
definitive interpreters of the Direct-Tax Clauses isn't 
apparent. Although Johnson is correct that some sup-
porters thought the Amendment was substantively un-
necessary, it's not as though they were obviously right 
on that point. 64 Those congressmen weren't going back 
to first principles. They were merely restating what had 
become the conventional wisdom before Pollock, and, 
not coincidentally, arguing that congressional power 
should be unconstrained. And, even if we assume that 
Congress can define constitutionality by majority vote, 
it's not clear that the Pollock-skeptics in Congress out-
numbered their opponents. 
With my understanding of the 
Direct-Tax Clauses and the validity of 
Pollock, the 16th Amendment was 
essential if Congress was going to 
have the power to enact an 
unapportioned income tax. 
But let's assume arguendo that we should care about 
how Congress in 1909 understood Pollock, and that 
Congress had some special power to validate or in-
validate the result in that case. With that under-
standing, Professor Johnson follows Professor Bruce 
Ackerman in arguing that Congress carefully crafted 
the resolution that became the 16th Amendment so as 
to indicate no acceptance of Pollock's expansive concep-
tion of direct taxes.65 Congress did this, the argument 
goes, so that after ratification of the Amendment, the 
law would revert to its pre-Pollock form -,with the 
Supreme Court's 1796 decision in Hylton as the con-
trolling understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses. 
If there were evidence to support that proposition, 
it might well affect how we interpret the scope of the 
Amendment today. 66 But there's no evidence what-
soever that the language of the 16th Amendment was 
selected to repudiate the understanding of Pollock (ex-
cept in the most obvious way, of course, by making it 
possible to have a tax on incomes without apportion-
ment).67 Maybe Pollock's expansive conception of what 
constitutes a direct tax has fallen by the wayside 
anyway,68 but, if that's happened, it's not because of 
64See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1107-14. 
65Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733; Ackerman, supra note 24, 
at 1117-20. 
66lt wouldn't have to have that effect. We might still con-
clude that, whatever Congress thought, the Court had gotten 
it right in Pollock. But Congress's view would probably (in-
evitably?) play some role in how we understand the vitality 
of Pollock. 
67 See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1091-1129 (dis-· 
cussing this point at mindnumbing length). 
68By "expansive" I mean as compared to the conventional 
wisdom before Pollock, when the assumption was that the 
Court had gotten it right in Hylton. As compared to original 
understanding properly interpreted, however, the Pollock 
Court's conclusion was not at all expansive. 
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anything the drafters did in fashioning the 
Amendment's language. 
The final language of the Amendment wasn't ham-
mered out on the floors of the Houses of Congress, with 
recorded debates to guiqe us as to what was happening 
(and from which Johnson and Ackerman might derive 
support). The language was drafted in closed sessions 
of the Senate Finance Committee - the all-but-final 
version of the resolution made its first public ap-
pearance fully formed- and the committee was con-
trolled by Pollock-friendly Republicans and chaired by 
Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, no fan of the 
income tax. 69 The argument that these folks were trying 
to come up with language to undercut Pollock's broad 
rationale is, quite simply, incredible. 
And the language changes that occurred along the 
way can't bear the weight that Johnson and Ackerman 
would impose on them. The final language of the 
Amendment - "The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion"70 - is silent about Pollock. It exempts one cate-
gory of taxes from apportionment, nothing more; it 
certainly reflects no clear attempt to undercut a broad 
reading of Pollock and thus to reinvigorate Hylton. Fur-
thermore, as I argue at the margin, the fact that the 
Finance Committee removed a reference to "direct 
taxes" in the language of a draft resolution, something 
stressed by Professor Johnson, actually undercuts his 
position.71 
In any event, if my understanding of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses is correct, the Amendment was essential to 
make an unapportioned income tax possible. If that's 
so, then the meaning of the term "taxes on incomes" is 
69See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1119. 
70U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
71Johnson thinks it's significant that Senator Norris 
Brown's original language was rejected: "Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect direct taxes on incomes without 
apportionment among the several States according to 
population." Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733 (quoting S.J.R. 25, 
61st Cong., 1st Sess., 44 Cong. Rec. 1568 (Apr. 28, 1909)). As 
finalized, the Amendment makes no specific reference to 
direct taxation. See supra text accompanying note 70. Accord-
ing to Johnson, "[t]he change, rejecting Brown's language, is 
relevant evidence that Congress, in proposing the amend-
ment, did not mean to treat the income tax as direct, and did 
not mean to make taxes that fell just outside the definition 
of income, as taxes that failed for want of apportionment." 
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733. 
I don't see it. If anything, the language change points in 
the opposite direction. The original Brown language suggests 
that there may be some income taxes that aren't direct (i.e., 
there are "direct taxes on incomes" but also therefore indirect 
taxes on incomes). Contrary to Professor Johnson's argu-
ment, if a congressman wanted to make it clear that Pollock 
was rightly decided, that an income tax is ipso facto a direct 
tax, he would have wanted to change the Brown language. 
Why not therefore read the final version of the Amendment 
as a vindication of Pollock? See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra 
note 1, at 1120. 
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critical in determining what direct taxes were, and 
what direct taxes weren't, exempted from the appor-
tionment requirement by the Amendment. 
The term used in the Amendment is "taxes on in-
comes," which doesn't come close to supporting the 
proposition that the pre-Pollock understanding was to 
be resuscitated or, more broadly, that all direct taxes 
are exempted from apportionment. The determination 
of what constitutes a "tax on incomes" should be in-
formed, I've argued, by the debates that led to the 
adoption of the 1894 income tax, and, after the Supreme 
Court struck down that tax as unconstitutional, by the 
process that culminated in the 16th Amendment. 
Those debates make it clear that the proponents of 
an income tax, and the proponents of the Amendment, 
saw income taxes and consumption taxes as fundamen-
tally different. 72 Before the modern income tax came 
into being, the national government relied almost en-
tirely for revenue on consumption taxes (tariffs and 
excises), which had increasingly come to be seen as 
unfair. The whole point of the push for income taxa-
tion, culminating in the 16th Amendment, was to 
rechannel the national government's historical reliance 
on consumption taxes, not to validate new, direct forms 
of consumption taxes. 
The 16th Amendment was intended to make it pos-
sible to enact an income tax without apportioning the 
tax. That's what it did, and that's all it did. (That was 
quite enough, thank you very much.) Any tax that is a 
direct tax but that isn't a tax on incomes remains sub-
ject to the apportionment rule. I've argued that a direct-
consumption tax is one example of a tax that must be 
apportioned, and I'll now argue that another such levy 
is a tax on wealth. 
B. Taxes on Wealth 
As I understapd him, Professor Johnson generally is 
arguing that the 16th Amendment reestablished the 
pre-Pollock understanding of direct taxation. But at 
times he seems to go further: He seems to be suggesting 
that the Amendment eliminated the direct-tax concept 
as a matter of constitutionallaw.73 That's the only way 
to make sense of his argument that an unapportioned 
wealth tax is a constitutionally permissible levy. 
There are two possible ways to conclude that an 
unapportioned tax on wealth would be constitutional. 
One is that a wealth tax isn't a direct tax, and the 
second is that, even if a wealth tax is a direct tax, it is 
also a "tax on incomes" and therefore removed from 
the apportionment rule by the 16th Amendment. Both 
possibilities fail, as I'll now demonstrate. 
1. Wealth taxes as direct taxes. Professor Johnson ar-
gues that wealth taxes weren't considered direct taxes 
by the Founders, and that an unapportioned tax on 
wealth would therefore be permissible today, even-
72I marshaled a seemingly endless series of quotations in 
support of that proposition in Jensen, Taxing Power, supra 
note 1, at 1100-02 and 1124-26. 
73Except perhaps for capitation taxes, which, if imposed 
at the same rate on all "heads," are automatically appor-
tioned anyway. 
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if I correctly understand his argument - without the 
16th Amendment.74 
That isn't a position that can be reconciled with any 
conception of original understanding. It's true, as 
Johnson argues, that the Founders understood that 
taxation of wealth was intended to be within congres-
sional power.75 (All direct taxes were within Congress's 
power.) But everyone, including the justices in Hylton, 
conceded that a tax on real estate (the quintessential 
tax on wealth in 1787) would be a direct tax.76 Congress 
thus could impose a wealth tax, but, to do so, it would 
have to apportion the tax. And Congress in fact did just 
that several times between 1798 and 1861 by enacting 
apportioned national taxes on real estate.77 
Professor Johnson can't have it both 
ways - citing Hylton as the correct 
product of 'giants' when it stands for a 
proposition he likes and then ignoring 
the same 'giants' when they say 
something he disapproves of. 
Professor Johnson can't have it both ways- citing 
Hylton as the incontrovertibly correct product of 
"giants" when it stands for a proposition he likes (that 
apportionment should be required only when it makes 
no difference78 ) and then ignoring the same "giants" 
when they say something he disapproves of (that an 
unapportioned tax on wealth is a direct tax).79 If 
74See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728-29. 
75See id. 
76In Justice Chase's words, the direct taxes "contemplated 
by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll 
tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other 
circumstance; and a tax on LAND." Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 
175 (Chase, J.). Justice Iredell agreed: "In regard to other 
articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt." I d. at 183. 
And, while Justice Paterson was unwilling to concede that 
no other taxes could be direct taxes, he too concluded that 
capitation and real-estate taxes were the "principal" ex-
amples of direct taxes: "I never entertained a doubt, that the 
principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of 
the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of 
apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land." Id. 
at 177. 
77See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292; Act of Mar. 
5, 1816, ch. 24, 3 Stat. 255; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, 3 Stat. 
216; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, 3 Stat. 164; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, 
ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. 
78 See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text. 
79Moreover, in the cases between Hylton and Pollock that 
Johnson concludes got the Direct-Tax Clauses right, holding 
that the clauses didn't limit the taxes at issue, the Supreme 
Court assumed that a real-estate tax is a direct tax. See, e.g., 
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("[D]irect 
taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capita-
tion taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real 
estate .... "); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875) 
(Footnote 79 continued on the next page.) 
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Johnson's case for an unapportioned wealth tax 
depends on the understanding in 1787, it's a loser.80 
2. Wealth taxes as income taxes. To be sure, Johnson 
has a backup position - that whatever the under-
standing of a wealth tax in 1787, the 16th Amendment 
removed such a tax from the apportionment require-
ment. And he can quote congressmen who, during 
debates on the 1894 income tax and, later on, during 
debates on the resolution that became the 16th Amend-
ment, characterized the modern income tax as an attack 
on concentrations of wealth.81 As I've argued else-
where, however, those congressmen were talking about 
imposing taxes on the wealthy through an income tax, 
not about levying taxes measured by the value of the 
wealth itself. Although the language used in floor 
debates may have occasionally been imprecise, hardly 
anyone was suggesting thatthe 16th Amenqment 
would be authority for the imposition of an unappor.;. 
tioned ad valorem tax on wealth.82 Why would· con-
gressmen have bothered with such a broader point, 
which could only have complicated the prospects of 
ratification? Getting authority for an unapportipned 
income tax represented an extraordinary expansion of 
the national revenue power as it was; the need for still 
other forms of taxation wasn't apparent at the time 
(and it's not apparent now either, for that matter). 
I We can argue about which interpretive principles should be given the greatest weight, but hitting the 'delete' key shouldn't be one of them. 
There simply isn't evidence to support the' proposi-
tion that the Amendment was intended to do away 
with the apportionment rule for direct taxes other than 
taxes on incomes. Professor Johnson throws in the 
obligatory quotation from Justice Holmes's 1920 dis-
sent in Eisner v. Macomber83 - "Holmes ... showed his 
wisdom by saying that '[t]he known purpose of this 
amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what 
(characterizing estate tax on real estate as excise on passage 
of value, as distinguished from tax on ownership of real 
estate, which would have been direct); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869) (noting that direct taxes 
imposed to that time had all been on real estate, and that 
"personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have 
never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct 
tax"). 
80ln another article Johnson relies on the concept of a 
"more general intent" of the Founders to support the 
proposition that a tax on real estate shouldn't be treated as 
a direct tax, even though the Founders said, to a man, that 
they thought such a tax was governed by the apportionment 
rule. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 70. I see no reason even to 
look for a "more general intent" on an issue about which we 
have absolutely no doubt: The Founders thought a tax on real 
estate was a direct tax. 
81 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733. 
821 have a fuller discussion of this point in Jensen, Taxing 
Power, supra note 1, at 1128-29. 
83252 u.s. 189 (1920). 
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might be direct taxes"' 84 - but Holmes provided no 
evidence or authority to support his understanding of 
the "known purposeu of the Amendment. 85 · He pro-
vided no evidence or autbority because there was none. 
What was "known" in the privacy of Justice 
Holmes's study isn't always of help in legal analysis, 86 
and most of Justice Holmes's colleagues, on the 1920 
Court didn't share his understanding of what for them, 
too, was recent history. Holmes was just wrong. At 
several points in its deliberations, the Senate had ex-
plicitly considered, and rejected, proposals to convert 
the Amendment into a full-fledged repeal of the Direct-
Tax Clauses. Such a step would really have eliminated 
those "nice questions" about meaning - indeed, 
Senator Anselm McLaurin of Mississippi urged doing 
away with the Direct-Tax Clauses for precisely that 
reason - but nothing like that happenedP 
A conscious decision was made to limit the 16th 
Amendment's scope to "taxes on incomes." All that the 
Amendment did - all that it was intended to do ..;_ 
was to make an unapportioned income tax possible. 
IV. Conclusion 
The apportionment rule was intended to constrain 
national power, but, for practical purposes, Professor 
Johnson's conclusion that the Direct-Tax Clauses no 
longer have effect may well be right. If that's so, how-
ever, it's because too much has happened to reclaim 
the original constitutional rules- and, of course, be-
cause the 16th Amendment dramatically reduced the 
need to even consider other possible revenue sources 
- not because principled constitutional analysis re-
quires such a result. 88 
As with the interpretation of other constitutional, 
statutory,. and regulatory provisions, understanding 
the Direct-Tax Clauses and the 16th Amendment re-
quires close analysis of language, purpose, structure, 
and ·history. We can argue about which interpretive 
principles should be given the greatest weight, but 
hitting the "delete" key shouldn't be one of them. 
Hitting "delete" is nevertheless what Professor 
Johnson urges us to do with the Direct-Tax Clauses. He 
favors "manipulative expansion" of terms to circum-
vent the inconveniences of the direct-tax apportion-
84Johnson, supra note 1, at 1734 (quoting Macomber, 252 U.S. 
at 219-20 (Holmes, }.,dissenting)). 
85 See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1061; see also 
Jensen, Taxation, supra note 58, at 711. 
86Justice Holmes also "knew" that "[t]hree generations of 
imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
87See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (dis-
cussing unsuccessful amendments by Senator McLaurin). 
88If a tax on wealth, say, withstands constitutional analysis 
today, it has to be because our constitutional understanding 
has changed, not because the position is consistent with 
original understanding. For Professor Ackerman, an unap-
portioned tax on wealth is permissible because several con-
stitutional "moments" have occurred over the years that have 
rendered original understanding irrelevant. See Ackerman, 
supra note 24, at 56-58. 
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ment rule:89 "Given its rapid expansion, 'excise' should 
be understood as a malleable concept that a [c]ourt can 
use to avoid apportionment. ... '[I]ncome,' too, is a 
malleable concept that a court can use to avoid appor-
tionment."90 With Johnson's help, a judge's job is really, 
really easy: Every national levy is an "excise/' a "tax 
89Johnson, supra note 1, at 1734. 
90Id. at 1733. 
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on incomes;" or maybe both- with no apportionment 
therefore required. 
I understand the appeal of legal realism as a descrip-
tion of what some judges do; I reject it as a model of 
desirable judicial behavior. Surely we can come up 
with a more principled approach to constitutional in-
terpretation than "manipulative expansion." . 
Johnson's response begins on the next page. 
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JENSEN'S RESPONSE TO JOHNSON'S RESPONSE TO JENSEN'S RESPONSE TO 
JOHNSON'S RESPONSE TO JENSEN (OR IS IT THE OTHER WAY AROUND?) 
By Erik M. Jensen 
Professor Johnson and I aren't converging on this 
issue, and perhaps we never will. We're spinning our 
wheels, regurgitating the same material, and (obvious-
ly) mixing, as well as piling on, metaphors. 
Now I'm accused of being "ahistorical" and doing 
the equivalent of "burying Barbie dolls at an ar-
cheological site and then pretending [I] have dis-
covered something profound." I guess that's supposed 
to mean I made a lot up and didn't fool anyone in doing 
so. Gosh, I thought my "forgeries" were good enough 
to be likened to Piltdown man, rather than Archeological-
Artifact Barbie. Oh, well. 
To my mind, while Professor Johnson has been sift-
ing sand looking for potsherds, he's missed the 
Pyramids.1 Johnson and I have such different concep-
tions of what was going on in 1787 that we're like two 
ships passing in the ... well, you know. It's probably 
because of a defect in my upbringing, but I don't under-
stand how anyone can seriously suggest that the direct-
tax apportionment rule wasn't intended to hobble the 
national taxing power. You can say that the rule is 
extremely clumsy (and I'd agree). You can come up 
with hypotheticals for which the rule doesn't work 
well. And you can argue, as many do (but Johnson 
doesn't), that original understanding should be ir-
relevant in constitutional interpretation. But the appor-
tionment rule wasn't intended to be a hobble? I don't 
begin to see it. 
Nor do I understand how Professor Johnson can 
expect us to believe that "[n]o proponent of this Con-
stitution could have tolerated a hobble on federal reve-
nue." Johnson has let his characterization of the Con-
stitution as a "pro-tax" document careen totally out of 
control. Yes, "tax won" in the fight over the Constitu-
tion, but you can't read the constitutional debates 
without realizing that an awful lot of Founders, includ-
ing Federalists, were insisting on restraints that 
Johnson says were intolerable. Of course the Founders 
wanted the national government to have the power to 
tax - everyone agrees on that proposition - but they 
were also very nervous about that power. The constitu-
tional context, Professor Owen Fiss has properly noted, 
was "defined by the desire to prevent abuses of the 
power of taxation."2 Without constraints on the nation-
al taxing power, there would have been no Constitu-
tion. 
Compared to the Articles of Confederation, which 
gave the national government no power whatsoever to 
levy taxes on individuals, the 1787 Constitution was 
10r he's been looking for Trojan artifacts in King Tut's 
tomb. 
20wen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, at 
88-89 (1993). 
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decidedly "pro-tax." But that label (and that's all it is) 
provides no justification for ignoring the specific limi-
tations on the taxing power included in the very same 
document - the Uniformity Clause and the Export 
Clause as well as the Direct-Tax Clauses. (Actually 
Professor Johnson isn't asking us to ignore the Unifor-
mity and Export Clauses, but why not, if "[n]o 
proponent of this Constitution could have tolerated a 
hobble on federal revenue"?) 
And "hobble" (which was Professor Johnson's word 
to begin with) doesn't mean "kill," at least not with the 
Direct-Tax Clauses. It's just not true that "what is left," 
after I have interpreted my Barbie dolls, "is an appor-
tionment clause that is just a tax killer." Sure, if a con-
gressman were to propose a direct tax that would have 
decidedly sectional effects, the apportionment require-
ment would probably doom that proposal, and a good 
thing too. But when Congress is willing to accept the 
negatives associated with apportionment of a par-
ticular tax- when the need for revenue becomes great 
enough to overcome apportionment's cumbersome-
ness and when the sectional effects will be acceptably 
small- Congress can enact apportioned direct taxes.3 
Lest this basic point be lost in the mass of shock-
and-awe verbiage, let me reemphasize that Congress 
did in fact enact a number of apportioned taxes on real 
estate between 1798 and 1861.4 It's hard to make ap-
portionment work, but, despite Professor Johnson's hy-
perbole, apportioning a direct tax can be done and it 
has been done. That's not a planted Barbie doll; it's an 
incontrovertible fact. 
The Constitution (and, for that matter, the Internal 
Revenue Code) ought to be interpreted using a stan-
dard of reasonableness. We should try to interpret even 
the most difficult provision in a way that makes as 
much sense as possible, and it's ordinarily not a sen-
sible result to interpret a provision as meaningless. If 
your reasoning leads you to conclude that Congress 
can avoid apportioning a tax on the ownership of real 
estate, slaves, or dogsleds simply by labeling the levy 
an "excise" - and, like Professor Johnson, you con-
clude that the Founders intended to bless such a sub-
terfuge - the appropriate response is to reconsider the 
premises that led to that bizarre result, not to celebrate 
it. 
3In a couple of places Professor Johnson characterizes me 
as interpreting the Direct-Tax Clauses to require that direct 
taxes be applied only to tax bases that are distributed in a 
reasonably uniform way across the country. Not quite right. I 
said that the system creates a powerful incentive for Congress 
to impose direct taxes in such a way. But if the apportionment 
rule is satisfied, Congress has the power to impose a direct 
tax on other items. 
4See note 77 in my article for the cites. 
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I've defended my understanding of indirect taxation 
("Duties, Imposts and Excises") in other places, with 
copious citations to founding-era sources that noted 
the relative safety of those levies compared to direct 
taxes. I'm sure I didn't get everything precisely right 
- if absolute precision is even possible on issues like 
these -but I haven't simply made it all up. And my 
understanding has reason behind it. 
In contrast, Professor Johnson stretches reasonable 
points out of shape to make debaters' points. For ex-
ample, he denigrates the idea of "avoidability" as the 
basis for distinguishing between indirect and direct 
taxes - indirect taxes on the transfer of goods are 
avoidable by not buying the taxed goods, direct taxes 
aren't similarly avoidable- because, he argues, almost 
any tax can in fact be avoided. You can avoid a tax on 
real estate, which was thought to be the quintessential 
direct tax, by not owning real estate; you can avoid an 
income tax by not having income (or, Johnson says, by 
"renouncing all earthly possessions"), etc. If any tax is 
avoidable in these ways, he suggests, the direct-in-
direct distinction breaks down. 
Come on. I'm surprised Professor Johnson didn't 
suggest that a capitation tax can be avoided by com-
mitting suicide. Let's return to planet Earth. The 
Founders thought that the difficulty of avoiding a tax 
on owning real estate or on one's own head was of a 
different order from the difficulty involved in avoiding 
a tax on the purchase of a bottle of whiskey. If the 
distinction isn't as precise as Professor Johnson might 
like, so be it, but that doesn't mean that no distinction 
exists, or that no distinction existed in the minds of the 
Founders. And distinctions don't become meaningless 
just because hard categorization cases inevitably arise 
at the margin. 
I can challenge lots of other points in Professor 
Johnson's article, but enough is enough, except for a 
coupl~ of final points about constitutional interpreta-
tion. Point number one: Johnson characterizes me as 
"wanting" to kill one sort of tax or another. He thereby 
conflates, as the man on the street does, questions of 
constitutionality and desirability. This isn't, or 
shouldn't be, a debate about the most desirable forms 
of taxation. Really. I began my research on the meaning 
of the tax clauses in the Constitution because I was 
curious. Folks who were proposing new taxes simply 
assumed that Congress could do as it wished, and that 
struck me as a suspect proposition. (It still does.) I 
knew there were constitutional provisions that, in 
form, seemed to limit the congressional power. I 
wanted . to understand those provisions as well as I 
could, even if they might constrain forms of taxation 
that - all other things being equal - I would prefer. 
In any event, if there's a potential problem with a 
proposed tax, it's better to know ahead of time than to 
have to clean the mess up afterwards. 
For example, whether I think Congress ought to be 
able to tax "Articles exported" or not - and all of the 
most prominent Federalists at the Constitutional Con-
vention thought Congress should have that power -
Congress can't do it. Period. If I describe the Export 
Clause in Article I, section 9 as having that effect, I'm 
not necessarily endorsing the description. If I were a 
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proponent of export taxation, I could argue that the 
Export Clause was a bad idea to begin with, that it 
ought to be applied today in only the most obvious 
situations, and that it ought to be eventually repealed. 
But the Export Clause can't be ignored just because it's 
inconvenient, and any reasonable policymaker ought 
to want to know about the dangers of going ahead with 
an overly aggressive interpretation of what Congress 
can do.5 
Interpretive point number two: Maybe this original 
understanding stuff is just irrelevant today, but, if it's 
not, we need to raise questions about what the 
Founders might have thought, or should have thought, 
or would have thought. If we're evaluating a form of 
taxation that wasn't known to the Founders, we have 
to think about how the Founders (and, depending on 
the type of tax, maybe the ratifiers of the 16th Amend-
ment as well) would have evaluated that form, apply-
ing the principles the Founders enunciated. Professor 
Johnson ridicules this woulda-shoulda-mighta process, 
but I can't imagine any form of interpretation more 
mindless than one that purports to accept the impor-
tance of original understanding, but then doesn't raise 
those questions. Would Professor Johnson really have 
us conclude that the Fourth Amendment has no 
relevance to electronic surveillance just because his 
giants didn't talk about it?6 
The question before the ratification of the 16th 
Amendment wasn't whether the Founders discussed 
personal income taxation - of course they didn't-
but how the principles they enunciated would have 
applied to an income tax. Professor Johnson's con-
clusion that a limitation on the taxing power should 
apply only to forms of taxation known in 1787 (and 
therefore can't apply to an income tax, say) makes the 
Constitution a joke. 
Oh, yeah. One other thing that gets lost in the heated 
discussion: The 16th Amendment made an unappor-
tioned "tax on incomes" possible. Whatever the mean-
ing of "direct taxes," whatever the intentions of the 
Founders about the desirability of direct taxation, 
whatever the proper understanding of Pollock, Con-
gress can enact an unapportioned income tax. We still 
5In the 1990s, after a long hiatus, the Supreme Court sud-
denly remembered how to strike down taxing statutes on 
constitutional grounds, in two cases involving the Export 
Clause. See United States v. International Business Machines 
Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996); United States v. United States Shoe 
Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). No longer should Congress be 
oblivious to constitutional constraints. 
6With taxes known to the founders, we shouldn't need to 
engage in such an inquiry. For example, we know for sure 
that the Founders thought that a tax on real estate was direct. 
It's more than a little bewildering that in this case, where 
there is absolutely no doubt, Professor Johnson applies his 
own version of a "shoulda analysis" to conclude that the 
founders wouldn't have considered real-estate taxes to be 
direct had they only thought the problem through in a 
Johnsonian way. 
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need to figure out what a "tax on incomes" is for con-
stitutional purposes, and I've concluded that the term 
doesn't include a wealth tax or a direct-consumption 
tax. But, regardless of what "taxes on incomes" means, 
the term is very broad. In trying to understand the 
TAX NOTES, August 11, 2003 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
limits on the taxing power, I'm not arguing that the 
Constitution requires an impotent national revenue 
system. So, even if I'm right about everything, Calvin 
- and of course I am - you don't need to throw out 
(most of) your class notes for Federal Income Taxation. 
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